The nature of the soul and its relationship to the body has always proved problematical for Christian philosophy. The source of the difficulty can be traced back to the efforts of the early Fathers to reconcile the essentially pagan concept of an immaterial and immortal soul with apostolic teachings about the after-life in which all the emphasis is placed upon the resurrection of the body. The tensions between these two traditions inevitably became strained during the sixteenth century when Protestant reformers insisted on a closer adherence to Scripture. Furthermore, even when leaving the problems of Scriptural hermeneutics aside, the dualistic approach to the question, in which soul (or spirit) and body are held to be categorically different in essence, had to overcome a number of intractable philosophical problems. So, it was not simply coincidence that when the new mechanical philosophy began to be formulated in a systematic way in the seventeenth century, it was couched in vigorously dualistic terms. In fact, three of the earliest fully elaborated systems of mechanical philosophy, those of Descartes, Digby, and Charleton, were explicitly intended to provide a philosophical prop for dualist theology.' Moreover Sci., 1982, 15: 211-239.
subtle, and manages to be innovatory while drawing heavily upon scholastic traditions and Renaissance philosophical eclecticism. A full exposition of his philosophy has yet to be attempted and is not within the scope of this essay.6 Here, we will look at Glisson only as he appeared to Henry More and Richard Baxter, two of the leading contemporary English theologians, who explicity dealt with his theories. While considering the background to and the reasons for their interest in Glisson it will become clear that medical theories frequently had a profound influence on philosophy and theology in the early modern period. Before embarking on this, however, it is important to recognize the intimate connexion between Glisson's new system of natural philosophy and his medical concerns, and to this we will turn first.
FRANCIS GLISSON'S MEDICAL PHILOSOPHY
Glisson's output in print is not extensive, and there is a clear continuity of interests and themes running through his published works. The continuity is most clear between the Anatomia hepatis of 1654 and his next medical treatise, the Tractatus de ventriculo et intestinis of 1677. However, as Temkin and Pagel have pointed out, there are a number of notions employed by Glisson in his early efforts to understand the nature of rickets which foreshadow his later ideas. Temkin has traced Glisson's concept of irritability, most famously expounded in De ventriculo, to his description of the pulse in De rachitide: as the arteries thrust blood into the parts of the body there is a certain resistance which "provokes" or "irritates" the heart and arteries into increasing the pressure. A strong pulse will not be found, therefore, where resistance is low, as in the rachitic. Pagel, on the other hand, has pointed to Glisson's early use of the concept of "tension" or "tone" in the nerves to account for both sense and locomotion. By brooding on the notion of irritation and the role of the nerves in this process Glisson 6 Glisson has been accorded a number of brief treatments, some of them very good, but he has not so far been considered more fully. An 1978, 20: 309-336; and idem. 'Helmont, Glisson, and the doctrine of the common reservoir in the seventeenth-century revolution in physiology', Br. J. Hist. Sci., 1983, 63: 261-272. Perhaps it is also worth pointing out in this connection that Glisson himself said that the full details of his system were not worked out. He suggested that the Royal Society might be called upon to perfect and complete it. See Glisson, op. cit., note 5 above, Epi.stola dedicatoria (to the Earl of Shaftesbury), sig. air. The present author is currently working on Glisson and his significance and hopes to add to this literature in the future; this essay is very much a preliminary sortie.
J. Henry was eventually led to his mature concept of irritability, in which all fibres in the body are said to be "irritable" even without the mediation of nerves.7
Glisson's first prolonged efforts, in Anatomia hepatis, to define the nature of "irritability" as a biological phenomenon presupposed that nervous sensibility in the irritated part was a sine qua non. "All irritation", he wrote, "indicates the existence of perception", and that, in turn, indicates the presence of nerves.8 Glisson considered different kinds of "irritation" which could activate particular nerves and so lead to bodily changes or movements. The nerves responded to three kinds of activation: perception or sensation, appetite, and muscular movement. This, as Temkin has shown, was entirely in accord with Galen's teachings about the threefold purpose of the nerves: sensibility in the organs of perception, initiation of movement in the organs of locomotion, and in all other organs "the recognition of distressing things" (equivalent to Glisson's concept of appetite).9
Glisson developed these ideas in anatomical lectures delivered to the Royal College of Physicians shortly after the publication of his book on the liver. In his lecture on the brain, Glisson averred that its actions and uses consisted "in the exercise of its noble faculties, perception, appetite and motion". 10 He seems to have had no difficulty in locating the faculties of perception and appetite in the brain and he felt confident, therefore, in locating the motive faculty in the same organ:
For if it be the braine wch perceives, it must be the braine also wch desires & the same wch prosecutes that desire. For the desire were in vaine, if the braine had noe power to move toward a prosecution of the same, & there would be noe animall motion, if the braine had no power to command it.tI However, although Glisson was convinced that the motive faculty is located in the brain, he was all too aware of the difficulty of explaining the operation of this faculty: the manner how this power or faculty is put in execution, is soe obscure & harde to be conceived, that the minde reflecting upon it selfe, cannot clearly trace its owne footstepps. It is hard indeed to follow the track of the idaea's [sic] from the outward senses to the braine, but much more difficult to trace the edicts of the braine back againe to the outward organs of motion, yet this in nature must be done.12
Abandoning all pretence to "a clear account of this", Glisson merely offered "some propositions about it". The first of these is that the brain could only excite the nerves to initiate motion by means of its own motion: 7 F. Glisson 
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Medicine and pneumatology For it is not conceivable, how the nerves should be excited, or they excite the muscles to worke according to the minde of the braine, if they were by no acte of the braine to give a signall to the nerves & outward organs; that acte must be some kinde of motion in the braine itself. For the braine cannot move the nerves, either by its perception or appetite, because those are both immament actions & cannot reache any thinge with out their owne subject.'3
The second proposition was that the brain's "imperiall kinde ofmandate" to the nerves "proceedes noe further, then to the grosse commande of such or such an action to be done".
For a beast which also may make such an animall motion, knows not soe much, as that he hath a braine or nerves or muscles. Wherefore, the braine cannot give a particular command to every nerve or muscle, when it excites a motion. But it is content with the giving such a generall excitation, that such a motion may be made. And upon such excitation, the nerves excite the muscles propper, whereby the motion is affected.14 The role of the brain in initiating the movements of bodily parts now begins to look precarious, and its supremacy is hardly supported by Glisson's third and final proposition. Here, Glisson unwittingly attributed to the nerves a mind of their own, as it were, which enabled them to carry out "such a grosse command as that last before mentioned". So, "the nerves serving for every motion, may be sufficiently excited" while "other nerves, upon that excitation will not at all be stirred", because those nerves onely, which are propper to the action required, have learned by custome & long practice, that they are to move upon such a signal given, and the other nerves have in like manner bene accustomed to sitt still upon the same signall ... wherefore, I conclude, that the nerves learne to execute the dictates of the braine, upon the signall given, by custome and often experience. 1 5
Only a few folios earlier, Glisson had described how memory and learning were special attributes of the perceptive faculty, that "immanent action" which "cannot reache any thinge with out [its] owne subject". 16 Small wonder, then, that Glisson's lecture on the brain and its three noble faculties breaks off abruptly at this point.
However, Glisson was not the only one to be confused about these matters. Even his mentor, the great William Harvey, had expressed contradictory ideas about the seat of perception in his De generatione animalium (1651). One moment Harvey implied that irritability depended on the mediation of the brain: that which is plainly devoid of all sensation does not seem to be able to be provoked in any way or to be excited to move or initiate any actions. And we have no other sure sign by which we can distinguish an animate and sentient creature from one that is dead and senseless except by its movement which is provoked by some offensive object and which follows immediately upon the experience of this sensation and so proves the existence of sensation. But it is reasonable to discuss this matter further when we treat of the actions and use of the brain.17 l 3Ibid. 4 Ibid., f. 165. 5 Ibid., ff. 165-6. 6Ibid., f.163.
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And yet, only a few paragraphs earlier, Harvey wrote about motions independent of the brain and other sensory organs:
Those motions and actions which the physicians call natural because they go on whether we will or no, and which we can neither moderate, accelerate, retard nor inhibit at our pleasure and are therefore independent of the brain, yet they are not performed without any sensation at all .... For whatsoever it is that by the diversity of its own movements strives against these things which provoke and molest it, must needs be endowed with sensation.18
Significantly, one of Harvey's examples of organs exhibiting innate sensitivity referred to the stomach and guts:
The stomach and guts attacked by bad humours, often stir up nausea, and belching, rumbling, vomiting and flux of the bowels, and it is not in our power to arrest these movements or to instigate them, and so I do not know of any sense depending on the brain which should excite those parts to actions of this kind.19 When Glisson decided to follow up his research into the anatomy and function of the liver, he chose as his subject the stomach and guts. It was during the course of this work that he developed his concepts ofnatural perceptions, appetites, and natural motility in all the fibres of the body even where no nerves were present. In developing these ideas, Glisson was able to draw not only upon various hints in Harvey, Galen, and Aristotle but also, as Pagel has shown, upon certain ideas found in the works of Joan Baptista van Helmont. In particular, the concept of nerves "learning" from experience whether to respond or not to a "grosse command" of the brain, which seemed so anomalous in his lecture on the brain to the Royal College, gave place to a general claim that all fibre in the body is capable of "learning" and "knowing" by virtue of its archeus or natural perception.20
By his own account, Glisson had completed his work on the stomach and intestines by 1662 but he held it back for fifteen years before publishing it. The reason he gave for this leaves us in no doubt as to the importance he placed upon his Treatise on the energetic nature ofsubstance for a full understanding of his anatomical work. His first draft of De ventriculo "presupposed in many places (although also proving in many places) a general Natural Perception" which had not been written about anywhere. Consequently, "it seemed right", Glisson wrote , that the draft "should be postponed until I could produce and bring into the light another Treatise, forerunner to this, on the Life of Nature".21 According to a manuscript fragment, Glisson believed that the delay would amount to no more than two years, but clearly he was over-optimistic. "After the triall of a year or two I founde the worke so difficult", he said, "that it seemed to involve the whole body of natural physiology."22 In the event, his "I Ibid., pp. 296-297. '9 Ibid., p. 297.
Tractatus ... de vita naturae appeared in 1672, five years before the final version of De ventriculo. It is here that Glisson developed and expounded the notion that substance or matter itself has an "energetic nature" and a "life" which is primarily exemplified in those three "noble faculties" he once reserved for the brain: the perceptive, appetitive, and motive faculties.
Glisson clearly agreed with Harvey's sentiments expressed in De generatione, that the only way to distinguish between "an animate and sentient creature" and "one that is dead and senseless" was in terms of perception and the ability to move in accordance with those perceptions.23 The point of Glisson's De vita naturae, however, was simply to show that there was no such thing as "dead and senseless" matter. All matter, organic and inorganic alike, was endowed with life, Glisson insisted, and that life was defined in terms of an intrinsic motility which could be activated by inherent perceptivity and appetite ( energetica, but it is clear from More's attack upon him, and Richard Baxter's defence, that its importance and relevance was recognized beyond the bounds of the medical profession.
In conclusion, then, we can say that although the Treatise on the energetic nature of substance is Glisson's only philosophical work, it cannot therefore be dismissed as a mere curiosity. It was developed as an essential complement to his medical writings and fits perfectly naturally into the rest ofhis oeuvre. Having relied heavily, in the Anatomia hepatis, on a concept of irritability to account for the periodic expulsion of large amounts of bile from the gall-bladder into the intestine, Glisson subsequently believed that the dependence of irritability on the presence of nerves created more problems than it solved. His development of hints from Aristotle, Galen, Van Helmont, and Harvey and his own researches on the digestive system led him to formulate his concepts of natural perception, natural appetition, and natural motion intrinsic to all body fibres. And these in turn led him to work out the implications of these ideas for general matter theory. The end result, in the Treatise of 1672, is a complete system of natural philosophy dealing not only with organic but also inorganic matter and arguing for a materialistic vitalism which could be used to cut the Gordian knot of problems associated with Cartesian dualism by showing that all matter was intrinsically alive and endowed with faculties of perception, appetition, and self-motion.
HENRY MORE AND MEDICAL IDEAS ABOUT LIFE AND THE SOUL
The major intellectual endeavour of More's career was to combat the atheism which he perceived to be increasingly prevalent among his contemporaries (educated and uneducated alike). His earliest publications, therefore, constitute what has recently been called "an important philosophical programme" by which More hoped to prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.28 In fact, it was the nature of the immortal soul which occupied most of More's attention (beginning with his Platonicall song ofthe soul, 1642, and culminating with his Immortality ofthe soul in 1659) because a refusal to believe in an after-life, with its attendant notions ofpunishments or reward, was seen by More as likely to have the most drastic consequences on social behaviour. The "practical atheist", the libertine scoffer who had no religious and (ipso facto, according to More) no moral scruples, was the greatest threat to the smooth running of society because his behaviour was not constrained by the fear of post-mortem punishments. 
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Medicine and pneumatology More elaborated his pneumatology, therefore, in an effort to provide the clearest and most forceful arguments for a personal after-life. 30 In his attempt to give a comprehensive and definitive account of the nature of the soul, More realized that he could not confine himself merely to a discussion of Christian doctrines. In view of his reputation as a leading member of the Cambridge Platonists it is hardly surprising that he should also consider Platonist and neo-Platonist arguments. However, his consideration of current medical theories might seem, from our point of view, somewhat unexpected. But once we recognize the background to seventeenth-century pneumatology it becomes clear that More simply could not ignore medical theories. As D. P. Walker has shown, the eclectic neo-Platonism of the Renaissance gave rise to a number of confusions or contaminations between notions of spiritus, pneuma, and anima. Medical theories of "spirit" were especially likely to lead to such confusions, Walker has argued, because it was frequently invoked to bridge the metaphysical gap between body and soul, or matter and mind.31 By the seventeenth century, there was a tradition, well established in spite of its potentially heretical nature, which tended to identify souls with medical concepts of spirit.32 This tradition could then be drawn upon by the early mechanical philosphers to explain those aspects of mental life which men share with animals. The Cartesian res cogitans was concerned only with abstract reasoning; all other aspects of human behaviour could be explained, analogously to animal behaviour, by the motions of animal spirits through the nerves and into the muscles. As I have argued elsewhere, Walker is perfectly correct to suggest that these heretical materialist concepts of soul contaminate even More's own concept of the soul.34 However, if we ignore these philosophical inconsistencies then it is true to say that More is totally committed to a dualistic belief in the existence of incorporeal substances. Essentially, these incorporeal substances fall under three headings. There is God himself, of course, and there are two different kinds of "created spirits". There are, on the one hand, all the immaterial souls of men, angels, and demons; and on the other hand, there is a ubiquitous "Spirit of Nature" pervading even deep within the densest material body. Now, More ingeniously used the mechanical philosophy to establish the existence of these immaterial substances. His early admiration for Cartesian mechanism stemmed from his belief that Descartes had shown "the just extent of the Mechanical Powers of Matter, how farre they will reach, and where they fall short." It was the short-fall that was important for More, since it enabled him to bring in the Spirit of Nature which was held to be A substance incorporeal, but without Sense and Animadversion, pervading the whole Matter of the Universe, and exercising a Plastical power therein according to the sundry predispositions and occasions in the parts it works upon, raising such Phaenomena in the World, by directing the parts of the Matter and their Motion, as cannot be resolved into mere Mechanical powers.5 If More's enterprise in natural theology was to succeed, therefore, he had to defend the immateriality of the Spirit of Nature at all costs. If he conceded any corporeality in his hylarchic principle, his whole philosophy was in danger of reduction to materialistic mechanism and became indistinguishable from the atheistic philosophy of "the most able Advocate" of materialism, Thomas Hobbes.36 The Spirit of Nature, therefore, was used to explain various physical phenomena, such as the descent of bodies due to gravity, cohesion, condensation and rarefaction, magnetism, and various other phenomena which proved to be problematic for the mechanical philosophy. On biological and psychological questions, however, More So, although the Spirit of Nature "assists in the very first beginnings of the Generation of Animals" it is superseded, in the higher animals at least, by the creature's individual soul.40 However, More's "main design" was not to distinguish between the Spirit of Nature and the soul but rather "to demonstrate that there is a Soul or Incorporeal Substance residing in us, distinct from the Body".41 Accordingly, he was compelled to discuss critically various medical theories current at the time.
For example, in order to reserve for the immaterial soul (or for the immaterial Spirit of Nature in lower animals) the architectonic or organizing power of living creatures, More had to examine and reject a common alternative view. This was the remarkable idea that "the Sun and the Stars are the most Intellectual Beings in the world, and in them is that Knowledge, Counsel and Wisdome by which all Sublunary things are framed and governed". According to this view, the sun and stars by their several impresses and impregnations have filled the whole Earth with vital Motion, raising innumerable sorts of Flowers, Herbs and Trees out of the ground. These have also generated the several kinds of living Creatures. These have filled the Seas with Fishes, the Fields with Beasts, and the Aire with Fowles; the Terrestrial matter being as easily formed into the living shapes of these several Animals by the powerful impress of the Imagination of the Sun and Stars, as the Embryo in the womb is marked by the strong fancy of this Mother that bears him.42
Outlandish as this may seem to us, it was an extremely common notion in More's day. Similar arguments can be found in the work of Jean Fernel, Marsilio Ficino, Paracelsus, and even Robert Boyle. One of the ancient sources for this view is Aristotle's De generatione animalium: "the spirit which is contained in the foamy body of the semen . .. is analogous to the element of the stars", and it is duly considered, 39 This is taken from the English translation of the scholia which are included in the so-called "Fourth edition" of A collection of several philosophical writings, London And the idea that these heavenly bodies could form a creature like "the most curious Automaton that ever was invented by the wit of man" simply by "a mere Rectilinear impress upon the Aether down to the Earth" was dismissed as untenable.44
More dealt similarly with other theories which suggested that the soul or the organizing power ofthe body was merely a special kind ofmaterial substance. Drawing from the full range of current medical theories, he refuted in turn the suggestion that actuation and guidance of the body together with perception and the other functions of the common sense could be performed by the body as a whole, the orifice of the stomach, the heart, the brain, the septum lucidum, the pineal gland, "Regius his small and perfectly-solid particle", the spinal marrow, and the animal spirits.45 We need not consider each of More's arguments in any detail but it should be noted that the major thrust of his discussion was to deny that matter itself is sufficient to Of course, the conditional clause is crucial to More's case and it is just that which he then proceeded to deny. The absurdity of Axiom XX could be shown simply by pointing out that wherever there is motion so must there be sense and perception. In other words a dead carcass, a ringing bell, a bent bow, and "every Jack-in-a-box that School-boyes play with" would have to be "living Animals or Sensitive Creatures". Furthermore, on Hobbes's account, the communication of thoughts from one person to another can only take place by the justling of one interlocutor's animal spirits against those of the other, "as ifmen should knock heads to communicate to each other their conceits of Wit."48
The essential point, then, of More's rejection of this mechanical account of perception is that matter is totally passive:
It is sufficiently manifest from sense and experience that Matter is a principle purely passive, and no otherwise moved or modified then as some other thing moves and modifies it, but cannot move it self at all. Which is most demonstrable to them that contend for Sense and Perception in it. For if it had any such Perception, it would by virtue of its Self-motion withdraw it self from under the knocks of hammers or fury of the fire; or of its own accord approach to such things as are most agreeable to it and pleasing, and that without the help of Muscles, it being thus immediately endowed with a Self-moving Power.
Matter, however, is "so stupid" that it lacks this Power of self-movement, as Hobbes, Descartes, or any strict mechanist would readily agree.49
Unfortunately for More, however, not everyone was a strict mechanist and subscribed to this concept of completely passive matter. As More's close associate, Ralph Cudworth, pointed out in his encyclopaedic survey of atheist philosophies, there were those who believed that matter was inherently active. The hylozoist, as Cudworth dubbed such a thinker, considered that all matter could move itself without muscles and that all matter could perceive and thereby could have a kind of sense without sensory organs or nerves.50 Cudworth was not slow to realize that hylozoism was much more dangerous to religion than the mechanical materialism (or "Atomick Atheism") of a thinker like Hobbes, 47 Ibid., 5, 59. 48 Ibid., 66, 86. 49 Ibid., 60. I use the term "strict mechanist" to refer to anyone who believed that matter was totally passive and inert. By no means all thinkers known to historians as mechanical philosophers were strict mechanists. I have argued elsewhere that the possibility of active matter was widely entertained among natural philosophers in seventeenth-century England: John Henry, 'Occult qualities and the experiemental philosophy: active principles in pre-Newtonian matter theory' Hist. Sci., 1986, 24: 335-381. 50 Cudworth is not so careful to distinguish between perception and sensation as Glisson was. Sensation only occurs in "animate" matter, that is to say matter which is sufficiently organized to enable the simple or natural perception of matter to perceive its own perception. This perceptio perceptionis or reduplicated perception constitutes sensation. It seems that highly organized, or animate, matter is able to dispose itself in such a way as to provide itself with special organs of sensation. This requires detailed exposition and analysis, but for now see Glisson Although Cudworth attached no names to the title hylozoist (apart from the ancient who allegedly founded the movement, Strato of Lampsacus), it is perfectly clear even from this briefextract that the Regius Professor of Hebrew had no one else in mind but the Reguis Professor of Physic at Cambridge, Francis Glisson. It was only Glisson who argued in print for the natural perception and the natural appetite of matter and who regarded life and matter as two conceptus inadequati of substance.52
So if in 1659 More could afford to dismiss the notion of sensitive and perceptive matter as "A thing so foolish and frivolous, that the mere recital of the opinion may well be thought confutation enough with the sober", after 1672 he was compelled to treat the idea much more seriously. For it was in that year that Glisson's Tractatus de natura substantiae energetica appeared.53
HENRY MORE AND FRANCIS GLISSON
Henry More returned to philosophical writing from more theological concerns during the preparation of his collected works, in Latin translations, for the so-called Opera omnia of 1679.54 More took the opportunity of the new edition to add scholia to his earlier philosophical works but he also published a number of short pieces for the first time.55 One of these new pieces, Ad. V.C. epistola altera, was concerned to refute the thinker whom he considered to be the most dangerous atheist since Hobbes, Benedict de Spinoza. We know from a letter of More' Spinozism, then, was regarded as a philosophical emergency which had to be treated immediately. The urgency of More's response stems in part from the fact that Spinoza, unlike Hobbes and the Cartesians, seemed to argue that matter is inherently active and "alive". This approach, More could hardly fail to recognize, completely undermined his previous attempts to establish the existence of incorporeal animating spirits, all of which were based on the Hobbist or Cartesian assumption that matter is completely passive and inert. It was during the course ofhis response to Spinozistic "living" matter that More paused in order to reject Glisson's arguments for the "energetic nature of substance". He took his cue from his fellow anti-Spinozist, Franciscus Cuperus:
So when Cuperus says that modern atheists nowadays believe in the innate life of matter, not in a mechanical mover, he gives a nod to some such hypothesis as the most distinguished Doctor Francis Glisson attempted to describe, with very accurate and clear arguments, in his Treatise de Natura Substantiae Energetica, or, de Vita Naturae. Whereas Spinoza contends that substance, in so far as it is substance, exists a se, indeed is that which subsists by itself so he [Glisson] holds that substance, qua substance, lives by the necessary power of its Nature, that is, it perceives, it desires and it moves itself [percipere, appetere, seseque movere]: which faculties; perceptive, appetitive and motive; he holds, accordingly, to be immediately present in matter itself.5
There follow eight closely argued folio pages against Glisson's philosophy and what More saw as its atheistic implications. It is clear from these pages that More had given close attention to Glisson's Tractatus, and it is easy to see why. Glisson took the concept of inherently active matter further than any of his contemporaries, including Spinoza.
Since Glisson believed that the energetic nature of substance was the internal principle of movements in matter he tried to take evidence for his case "from various motions observed in Nature". Glisson understood the word "motion", in the Theologico-politici confutationem complectitur, paucaque sub finem anne.xa habet de libri Francisci Cuperi scopo, cui titulus est, Arcana Atheismi revelata, pp. 565-614. The identity of V.C. still engages scholarly speculation: there is a footnote about it in Gabbey, op. cit., note 2 above. pp. 214-215; and see also Paolo Cristofolini, Cartesiani e sociniani: studio su Henry More, Urbino, Argalia Editore, 1974, pp. 139-141. Cristofolini also reprints the latin text of Ad V.C. epistola altera, pp. . 57 More, Opera omnia, 1: 601. Glisson is mentioned on p. 601 and examined in detail pp. 604-611. Translations from this are mine.
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Aristotelian sense, to mean "change" and so a number of his examples of motion may seem unfamiliar to us. Not only did he argue from the motion "of the Heavens and Planets and even the Earth itself around the Sun", the motions caused by horror vacui and "the motion of Rarefaction and Condensation" but also from "the motion of solidity" [motus Antitypiae], "the motion of coherence" [motus nexus], and "the motion of freedom" [motus libertatis] (by which he meant the elastic tendency of a compressed body, say, to return to its former state when external pressure is removed).58 Henry More attempted to refute each of these in turn. The resistance or solidity of matter cannot be used to prove the vitality of matter, he insisted, because "substance qua substance" is sufficient to explain solidity. By which, presumably, he meant that solidity is part of the definition of matter.59 Elsewhere he called upon the mechanical philosophy in an effort to show that Glisson's vitalism was an unnecessary hypothesis. The coherence of matter can be explained more simply (so More believed!) in terms of Cartesian circular motion, the plenum, and the non-interpenetrability of matter. Similarly, "the Motus Coelorum, that is, the Vortexes, does not indicate any perceptive life in the matter of the vortexes, since such a portion of motion is impressed on them mechanically, or much more likely by some immaterial principle, that they revolve freely in these gyrations entirely without self-perception."60 Needless to say, the immaterial principle alluded to here is More's "Spirit of Nature", and he invoked that in his rejection of all Glisson's other examples of different kinds of motion. "The parts of matter", for example, "cohere and are connected by the one universal bond of the Spirit of Nature which holds together and actuates the whole material world." It is the hylarchic principle, then, which accounts forfuga vacui and for motus libertatis. When air is caused to expand by heating, for example, it is merely due to increased vibration of the particles and, on cooling, the air returns to its former volume "not by -363) we learn that there are three kinds of non-perpetual motion depending on whether the motive principle is internal, external, or a mixture of both. In order to establish his claims about the innate motility of all matter, Glisson discounted the first of these (which is not in contention) and turned his attention to the last two kinds which he called, in keeping with the common opinion, "inanimate". Inanimate motions are divided into five classes which embrace the other examples of "Species" of motion which More singled out. Motus libertatus is discussed at p. 375, motus condensatione et rarefactione at p. 376, fuga vacui at p. 367, but see also p. 432. 59 More, opera omnia, 1: 605. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid., p. 606. More used similar arguments, employing the Spirit of Nature to account for phenomena which could be explained perfectly adequately without it, in his Enchiridion metaphysicum: sive de rebus incorporeis succinta & luculenta dissertatio. Parsprima: de existentia & natura rerum incorporearum in genere, London, E. Flesher, 1671. Consequently, he had already attracted the attention of the two leading Medicine and pneumatology More' s "confutation" of Glisson's internal principles of motion, philosophically unsatisfactory though it is, stands representative of all his arguments. He never met Glisson on his own terms but was merely content to assert that everything Glisson used to support his case actually supported the existence of the Spirit of Nature. Glisson's arguments, More somewhat petulantly insisted, "do not prove that life emanates from matter itself or that life is not communicated to it by an immaterial Principle". The point is, of course, that More was driven by his theological concerns to beg the very questions that really divided him from Glisson. At one highly significant point in his discussion More let the reason for his anxiety show: "This argument [that internal motion is a sufficient principle of life] cannot prove that matter is autozoon [self-living] and endowed with perceptive and appetitive life, unless it is previously supposed that there is no God who can create a Spirit purely Plastic and set it over the matter of the world."62
According to More, then, this vitalist way of arguing was even more dangerous than Hobbist mechanism. Glisson actually seemed (by implication) to take providence out of God's hands and to implant that too directly within matter when he asked "Is Nature so far fortuitous that it begins a new operation of its own record without any purpose to itself'? or does it rather manage all things wisely and not without admirable providence?"63 It was speculations like these which led More to denounce Glisson's philosophy in the strongest terms: "Only those who deny God and all incorporeal substance; strive to seek the origin of motion and all life which gleams in the universe in matter itself."64
More clearly announced that Glisson's philosophy "should certainly carry some weight with those who deny any substance beyond body. For, then it may be reasonable enough to decide that a kind of life is immediately and primaevally present in matter, whose characteristic properties of life; which are thought to be, and are 62 More, Opera omnia, 1: 607. 63 Ibid. This is a quotation from Glisson's ch. 17, sect. 3 (as More tells us). It is to be found in Glisson. op. cit., note 5 above, p. 226. The point of Glisson's rhetorical questions was to affirm that matter must have perception and appetite: "I am unable to conceive how it happens that motion arises purely from an internal principle, yet that principle neither desires nor perceives." 64 More, Opera omnia, 1: 607.
65 Ibid., p. 608. 66 Ibid. See also p. 611 where More concluded that the "modern atheists", of whom Cuperus speaks, "who profess a vital principal in the created World, but because of life arising from matter itself, and who do not believe that there is anything in nature beyond this living matter, can scrape together for themselves nothing from the writings of Glisson by which they very greatly support their cause." I should point out that the charge of atheism was an extremely serious one at the time and, consequently, More pointed out that Glisson "not only acknowledges but so often insists upon the existence of the Creator God and other incorporeal substances", p. 607. As we shall see, it is perfectly possible to propound a natural philosophy like that of Glisson for our discussion is the fact that just two years after the appearance of More's Ad. V.C. epistola altera Glisson's name appeared once again in a theological context; but this time he was cited with approbation. Richard Baxter, in his Methodus theologiae christianae (1681), deferred twice to Glisson. Once, in the preface, on the subject of the active principle in nature, and once on the subject of "Virtus activa vitalis". 70 The precise meanings of these references are (at least to this reader) somewhat obscure but, fortunately, Baxter expanded his views on active principles and on Glisson's De natura substantiae energetica in a letter to Henry More written in the same year. It was written at More's request because "It seemed good to the worthy Dr. to desire my thoughts of his Description of a Spirit, which he laid down in the first Edition of Mr. Glanvile of Apparitions".71 The fact that More published a long reply to this private letter (in the second edition of Glanvill's History of apparitions) is powerful testimony to More's sensitivity to criticism on this issue and of his protectiveness towards his concept of spirit. This reply, entitled A letter to a learned psychopyrist, appeared early in 1682; whereupon, within months, Baxter published his original letter, together with a defence of it in a discourse Ofthe nature ofspirits. However, the last word on the matter went to More (again a sign of the importance More attached to his own style of pneumatology), this time writing as the anonymous commentator on Bishop Rust's Discourse of truth.72 This polemic, so far completely overlooked, contains a good deal of interest for the intellectual historian but, for the sake of brevity, we will confine ourselves here to those parts of the dialogue which involve Glisson Medicine and pneumaitology So, Baxter regarded fire as "a Substance permeant and existent in all mixt Bodies on Earth ... in your Blood it is the prime part of that called the Spirits, which are nothing but the Igneous Principle in a pure aerial Vehicle and is the Organ of the Sensitive Faculties of the Soul".78 Clearly, Baxter would agree with Richard Lower (to take one example from many like-minded physiologists) that "the blood in its course through the arteries is like a flaming fire." Once again we can see the profound influence of medical ideas about spirits and the nature of the soul on a leading theologian. 79 Among such general indications of a familiarity with current medical thinking in Baxter's discourse on the soul we also find numerous specific references to Glisson. In view of the frequency of these references and Baxter's failure to name any other medical writer (unless we count a passing reference to Daniel Sennert on page 18), it is safe to assume that Glisson was the single most important source for Baxter's views on medical spirits.80 Indeed, Glisson's opinions are drawn upon right at the beginning of the first letter to More:
I think you and I are agreed that we cannot conceive of a Spirit unico conceptu. but must have two inadequate conceptions of it: of which one is that which Dr. Glisson De Vita Naturae calls conceptus.fundamentalis, and is that which we call Substantia ... the other inadequate conceptus is Formal; and I think you and I are agreed that this is Virtus Una-tria, as described by me, viz.
Virtus vitalis, vitaliter activa, perceptiva, appetitiva, as Dr. Glisson speaks. 81 More's response to this was to argue that from these two inadequate conceptions of spirit "one adequate Conceptus does result" but, thankfully, we do not have to pursue the philosophical niceties of this typical piece of seventeenth-century theology. Suffice it to say that More immediately recognized the danger implicit in Baxter's Glissonian approach, "[which] is not only a mistake but a mischief, it implying that the Virtus Appetitiva and Perceptiva, may be in a substance though Material which betrays much of the succours that Philosophy affords to Religion in the points of the Existence of a God and Immortality of the Soul."82 The safe way to salvation, More insisted, was through his own recension of Cartesian mechanism. This was a new philosphy which still fulfilled the age-old role of hand-maiden to religion: "This mode of philosophy is the most useful for the best ends, and serves to support the main parts of natural Religion the best; namely the Existence of God, of Genii or Angels, and the The crucial difference between More and Baxter should now be abundantly clear. More, in spite ofhis many disagreements with Descartes, was always totally committed to the dualist distinction between body and soul (or spirit). Baxter, on the other hand, seems to have had a much clearer sense of the philosophical shortcomings of any dualist system.88 By insisting so vigorously on the categorical difference between body 83 Ibid., p. 225. J. Henry "philosophical" book cannot be dismissed as merely a physician's dilettantish excursion out of his own field into philosophy, which adds nothing to my claim that medical concepts were important to contemporary philosophy. When Glisson wrote, there was no sharp distinction, as there is today, between philosophy and science, or rather philosophy and natural philosophy. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that Glisson's system of philosophy was specifically and quite explicitly developed to provide the underpinning for his medical ideas on the irritability or natural perception oftissue even where there are no nerves or sensory organs present. Glisson's Treatise on the energetic nature ofsubstance, therefore, was a new system ofphilosophy which grew directly out ofthe pioneering physiological work pursued by one of Harvey's most able successors. In view of the contemporary recognition of the importance of medical theories to a crucial philosophical debate about the nature of the soul and the validity of dualism, it was inevitable that Glisson's medical philosophy should strike leading thinkers as a work of fundamental importance.
